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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

Policy Evaluation on Implementation of ISPS Code
in the Nigerian Maritime Industry

Degree:

Master of Science

This research analyzed the policy implementation of the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code in the Nigerian maritime industry. The study employed
the use of both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary data was collected
through the administration of questionnaires to 200 respondents in Nigerian Maritime
Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), and Nigerian Port Authority (NPA)and
Port Facilities Security Officers (PFSO) while only 167 questionnaires were returned.
In order to analyze the data collected from both primary and secondary sources,
simple statistics were employed. The study revealed that the ISPS Code unit in
NIMASA became operational in 2014, and the temporal variation shows that there is
an annual increase in the level of compliance of port facilities to ISPS Code since
inception to date.
The study also revealed that the ISPS Code has contributed immensely to port
security and efficient port operation, but is faced with typical problems like poor
funding, inadequate modern technology, infrastructural deficiency, corruption, etc. It
can be inferred from the literature review that the maritime industry faced so many
identifiable criminal acts like piracy, stowaways, corruption, sabotage, terrorism,
pilferage, etc. this menace posed greater threats to efficient port security and
operations.
However, the implementation of the ISPS Code drastically reduced these
criminal acts thereby improving significantly the effective and efficient port
operations. The enforcement of the ISPS Code improved the awareness of the Code
amongst the operators of the maritime industry. It also increased the level of port
facilities in compliance, and the total number of vessels with interface with the port
facilities.
Finally, the study revealed that the challenges encountered in the
implementation of the code tilted more toward poor funding as revealed in the
responded questionnaire.
KEYWORDS: Transport Policy, ISPS Code, Ship Compliance, Ship Security,
Nigerian Maritime Industry, Implementation, Port Facilities, Foreign Vessels, IMO.
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Chapter 1
1.1

Introduction and Background of the Study

Maritime security measures are steps user event and react to threats and undesired
activity in the sea region (Luft & Korin, 2004). Looking at a country's natural resources
might provide an idea of the value of its maritime domain. Maintaining a safe and
secure maritime environment for all of these purposes (Liddick, 2014). UNCLOS,
SOLAS, the ISPS Code, and others were intended to guarantee coastal governments
have corollary rights in marine matters. Long-term safety and security of shipping
routes and ports are also necessary for maritime ecosystem preservation (Jesugbamila,
2010). The Nigerian government has accepted a number of IMO several pertaining to
the security and safety of ports and marine infrastructure. The federal government has
made steps to carry out the provisions of the Act domestically and via the appropriate
agencies of the federal government (Onwuegbuchunam et al., 2021).
Responding to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, in the United States,
the ISPS Code was developed in 2004 as an international standard. ISVS (International
Code of Security for Vessels and Port Infrastructure) was developed by the IMO.
Keeping ships, ports, cargo, and crew members’ safe is the primary purpose of the
code. In 2004, Nigeria, a maritime country, approved the code.
It is essential that international ships in transit, port infrastructure, and marine
life be adequately safeguarded, and the ISPS Code does just that. With an emphasis on
international shipping, the code includes maritime standards and guidelines aimed at
detecting and mitigating risks to global security. Security hazards from ships and port
infrastructure may be identified with the use of the code in international commerce.
2006 was a successful year (Ndikom, 2006).
ISPS is one of the most significant global security initiatives ever undertaken,
having implications that go well beyond the maritime sector (Bichou, 2004). For a
long time now, the mariner has been plagued by terrorist threats and other acts of
terrorism. When it comes to maritime firms, dishonesty and fraud-like inclinations
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have exacerbated rather than reduced the issue of excessive port security (Otto and
Ukpere, 2012).
The GOG has lost a large amount of revenue as a consequence of maritime
instability. There were 34 incidents in the GOG in the first three quarters of 2020,
according to a report from the IADCSO. In the international arena, piracy in Nigeria's
coastal waters and its devastating economic impact on the country's economy has been
resurrected. More than two dozen armed assaults and pirate occurrences were recorded
by Nigeria's marine safety agency in the third quarter of 2020. The international
community has paid great attention to this trend, which tends to raise questions about
the compliance level of port facilities with the ISPS code. As a result, Nigeria's
maritime security is a critical national resource for safeguarding the country's national
assets. Further benefit of this is the defence of strategic, economic, and political assets
abroad. In response to these threats and the Gulf of Guinea's incapacity to properly
manage marine security, regional solutions and outside support have become
imperative.
Concern over maritime piracy and threats to maritime sea lines of
communication were raised by the UN Security Council in two resolutions on 31
October 2011 and 29 February 2012, which served as a foundation. An additional
focus of the paper is the development of an international network for exchanging data
across countries and regional organizations (Kelly, 2014). Recent years have seen an
upsurge in African attempts to address maritime security challenges in a regional and
international framework. Piracy in the GOG will be the topic of an AmbassadorialLevel Meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission in 2021. International and regional
stakeholders benefit from the Peacebuilding Commission's support for initiatives such
as the Yaoundé Code on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in West
and Central Africa, which is currently being implemented in the region, as well as
Egypt's assistance in the form of technical assistance, training courses, and capacity
building initiatives.
A growing number of maritime security risks has alarmed academics and other
stakeholders in the maritime industry as well. Years of piracy and other maritime crime
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has plagued Nigeria's waters and piracy off the coast of Nigeria has increased in the
GOG. Marine transportation is vital to our daily lives, but it also comes with significant
dangers that, if allowed unchecked, might jeopardize a nation's economy (Igbokwe,
2012). Terrorism and piracy in the marine realm have the potential to have a negative
influence on the global transportation network. The safety of ships, their cargo,
passengers, and crew has always been a primary issue since the advent of
transportation and global trade. When it comes to maritime transportation, pirates
might be considered as an antecedent to today's terrorists since they have always posed
a danger to ships, cargo, passengers, and crew. Ships and their cargo may sail across
oceans safely if they carry a small amount of weapons and ammunition as a basic and
primitive self-help security measure. This standard, acknowledged, and allowed
practice was designed to meet this need. The worldwide maritime community had to
respond, and they did.

1.2

Problem Statement

According to NIMASA, maritime instability cost the country and neighbouring
countries along the Gulf of Guinea coast $793.7 million in 2016 (Jamoh, 2021) citing
the oil and fishing industries' losses, as well as ransom payments and insurance
premiums, as the primary sources of these losses.
It was in 2004 when Nigeria accepted the International Standards for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (ISPS). Several studies show that despite the ISPS
Code's implementation, maritime insecurity has increased in Nigeria. According to
(Okoronkwo, Et. al., 2014). There has been an increase in pirate activities in Nigeria's
maritime domain (Abiodun, 2015). Most attacks on GOG occur in Nigeria, a recent
study finds, and this is not surprising (Nwokedi, 2016). There have been more than
two-thirds of Nigerian pirate attacks, and almost three-quarters of all piracy events, in
Lagos ports and anchorages (Nwokedi, 2016). IMBAR from 2002 to 2015 shows an
irregular amount of attacks every year. A look at the contradictory statements shows
that there are considerable inconsistencies when it comes to security measures at ports
and ships. The adoption of the ISPS Code in Nigeria will be examined.
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1.3

Aim and Objectives of this Study

The aim of the study is to evaluate the Transport Policy Implementation of the ISPS
Code in Nigerian maritime industry. The specific objectives of the study were to;


Evaluate the compliance level of Nigerian port facilities with the ISPS Code;



Evaluate port facilities with interface with the foreign vessels; and



Examine the challenges to the ISPS Code's implementation in Nigeria.



Highlight lessons learned from the Implementation of ISPS code from
Neighboring countries.

1.4

Research Questions

Emanating from the objectives of this study, the following questions guided the study?


To what extent are port facilities compliant with the ISPS Code?



How many port facilities have interface with foreign vessels?



What are the challenges so far to the ISPS Code's implementation?



Are there any lessons from the implementation of the ISPS Code from
neighboring countries?

1.5

Significance of the Study

Nigerian ports and facilities have a need for this research to identify the frequency of
high-level security concerns as well as how well the ISPS Code has been adopted in
Nigeria, and how it may be utilized to tackle security issues on ships and at ports, as
well. Governments, municipalities, shippers, and port companies may use this study
as a guide to enhance maritime security. It might also act as a point of reference for
other related events. For students in the same field, it might serve as a guide for future
study.

1.6

Structure of the Dissertation

The structure of the dissertation is divided into five chapters as follows;
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Chapter 1 includes the introduction and background of the study, problem statement,
aim/objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study, and
organization of the study.
Chapter 2 covers the review of related literature on the subject matter and a
detailed discussion of an important concept.
Chapter 3 sought to enumerate the research method, design, data collection
methods, operational measures of the study variables, and data analysis techniques
used
Chapter 4 reveals the presentation and data analysis while Chapter 5 gives the
summary, conclusions, and recommendations of the research work.
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Chapter 2
2.1

The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)

The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, is a vital maritime
regulation that ensures the safety and security of ships, ports, cargo, and crew. Prior to
the ISPS code, the safety of ships at sea was the main priority of SOLAS. SOLAS was
updated, and Chapter XI, which covers measures to improve marine safety, was
renamed Chapter XI-1, and a new Chapter XI-2 with a greater emphasis on maritime
security was added. This is because security and safety are fundamentally distinct
concerns. Currently, international ships and port facilities are protected to the highest
standards by the ISPS Code. On September 11, 2001, as a direct reaction to the attacks
on the World Trade Centre, it was adopted. The international community has decided
to build a new security regime for ships and port infrastructure utilized in international
trade in order to identify and prevent security concerns and incidents. ISPS was created
in response to this danger by states, government agencies, and municipal governments,
as well as the shipping and port sectors in partnership with the IMO. Maritime security
was improved with the 2002 amendments to the 1974 Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea. The International Code for the ISPS outlines the security procedures for
ships and port facilities in response to prospective threats. Standards, consistency, and
dependability are the main objectives of the ISPS code. Providing governments with
this data will make it simpler to strike a balance between increasing threats and
evolving vulnerabilities for ships and port infrastructure. Just as with any new
regulation, the general public, including sailors and port users, initially had serious
reservations about the ISPS code. Many individuals are starting to see the importance
of coding as a part of shipping. Few dispute that the code may be improved by making
it more sensitive to the real threats of piracy and stowaways (Bergqvist, 2013).
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2.2

Objectives of the ISPS Code

The ISPS Code has been established to guarantee that the safety of ships and port
facilities is never compromised. With this code, the marine transportation sector will
have a standard framework for risk assessments.
According to the IMO, the main goals of the ISPS code are as follows:
1. To minimize security problems involving ships or port facilities that are
utilized in international commerce, a global framework of collaboration
between contracting countries, government agencies, local administrations,
and the shipping and port industries must be established.
2. To figure out the national and international responsibilities of the different
parties engaged in maritime safety and pirate prevention.
3. In order to gather and share security-related data quickly and efficiently.
4. So that plans and procedures may be put in place as security changes, providing
a framework for measuring security levels.
5. Make that ships at sea have appropriate and rational security measures in place.

2.3

Contents of the ISPS Code

The ISPS code is comprised of parts A and B. While the first component (A) must be
implemented, the second component (B) is optional and provides as an example of
how to do so.

Part A
Part A of the ISPS code has 19 sections and 2 appendices. Part A is divided into 19
sections. Each part of the Code contains definitions, applications, duties, and technical
information. It explains the significance of:
1. All of the parties involved in the contract have their obligations stated out in
the agreement.
2. Criteria for determining whether or not a security plan or risk assessment is
appropriate.
3. The manner in which the records are to be given and maintained.
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4. The specifics of the training and fitness routines followed by the members of
the crew and personnel.
5. Appendices A contains the methods for certifying and verifying ships'
International Ship Security Certificates and Interim-ISSC samples. To discover
the requirements for awarding certifications, utilize these forms.
Part B
Like ISPS Code Part A, this code consists of 19 sections and 2 appendices. Topics
discussed in Part A may be further explained and illustrated in Part B. Components
may be applied It's a waste of effort to try to fix an issue without addressing all of its
components. Because of this, the primary flaw in the ISPS code may be rendered
ineffective if all parties implement ISPS code part B at the same time they accept ISPS
code part A. The port facility's DOS and Statement of Compliance forms are included
in Section B of the document.

2.4

Implementation of the Code in Nigeria

Ships traveling internationally are required by law to adhere to the ISPS Code. All
ships having a gross tonnage of at least 500 metric tons are included in this category.
There is no commercial use of warships or naval auxiliary ships or any other
government vessels. Any port facilities within the authority of the contractual
government, as determined by the contracting government to be in compliance with
this legislation, are subject to this clause (Osnin & Shah, 2003).
Over 86% of ships and 69% of port facilities subject to the new code had
security measures authorized by February 2005, despite worries about the "unrealistic"
deadline and anticipated disruptions to international commerce on the day that code
went into effect. Since only 56% of the certificates had been issued as of July 1, 2004,
the installation of the code has slowed down (for example, Africa and some countries
in Eastern Europe). US inspections led to the denial of entry, expulsion, or
imprisonment for 8.5% of the inspections conducted, making them the most visible
enforcement mechanism for the ISPS Code. Non-compliant vessels were discovered
to be registered under flags of convenience in the majority of cases, reports said.
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From 7%−8%, the NIMASA strengthened its compliance with the International Ships
and Ports Security Code (Akpobolokemi, 2014).
Dr. Bashir Jamoh, the Director-General of the NIMASA, asserts that NIMASA
has achieved a level of ISPS Code compliance greater than that of the IMO. They were
informed that the concerns they voiced in 2018 had been addressed and that this was
the truth. The Deep Blue Project and the SPOMO Act are also being used by NIMASA
to combat pirate activity in the Gulf of Guinea, according to the agency's director
general.
Currently, only 22 of Nigeria's out of 127 jetties are completely compliant with
the ISPS standards, making it the least developed country in Africa. US Coast Guard
Admiral Neffenger, the deputy commandant for operations, delivered a diplomatic
statement on behalf of Homeland Security stating that the number of Nigerian port
facilities that are fully compliant has risen from 9 to 22 since the last visit of the US
government in 2015 (Samson, 2014).

2.5

Nigerian Ports Before and After NIMASA Takes Control of ISPS

Before NIMASA had full responsibility for ISPS code implementation, less than 10
ports had proper anti-terrorism safeguards in place. As the new Destination Authority
(DA), NIMASA has been able to increase Nigerian port compliance from 7%−70% by
hammering them with COE. In two years, the government of President Goodluck
Jonathan appointed a DA to monitor the implementation of the ISPS Code, which went
from 7% to 83% compliance. Importers no longer had to worry about their goods being
destroyed because of the high level of compliance, and wharf rats were eliminated as
a consequence.
2.6

ISPS Operations Code

The ISPS Code is based on a risk assessment and risk minimization. Performing a
security review is a critical stage in the implementation process. As part of a security
evaluation, flaws in the infrastructure and superstructure as well as databases and other
information systems might be found. At risk of a security breach are these areas:
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people or property. In addition, solutions for decreasing or eliminating risks and their
repercussions are offered.
The code includes security evaluations for both the PFSA and the ships that
docked there. The port facility's and the vessel's security plans should be in place by
the time the system is put into operation. As a consequence, performing security
assessments is a crucial stage in developing and changing security policies and
procedures. This person is responsible for overseeing the implementation of each
strategy's security measures (Mejia, 2004).

2.6.1 Ship Security Assessment (SSA)
Identifying weaknesses in the design or operation of a ship is the goal of the SSA.
Section A of the ISPS code specifies an on-site security review. You must take into
account important persons and activities as well as those that provide services and
operations. Even if a ship is moored or parked at sea, it still has threats and weaknesses.
If you have a ship moored in an area with a high risk of harm, it's crucial to be aware
of it. Another factor that must be taken into account is the tension between safety and
security.
Company security officers (CSO) are responsible for safeguarding the
company's ships. An ISPS code ship security assessment must be performed on every
vessel owned or operated by the firm. It may then be possible to grant an Interim ISSC.
Since it has been acknowledged for its work with security issues, an RSO may be able
to supply SSA to governments contracting with it.
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Figure 1
An Assessment of the Ship's Security in Accordance With the ISPS Code
(Mazarheri, 2008).

2.6.2 Ship Security Plan (SSP)
After the SSA is finished, the SSP will be developed in compliance with the SSA. The
basic objective of any ship's security policy is to ensure that every precaution taken on
board is successful in protecting the vessel and her crew at all times. The SSP must be
ready for any eventuality, and the proper measures must be taken according on the
specific risk that is being faced. Regular evaluation and updating of the SSP is
recommended by the SSA. Just like SSA, RSOs may do SSP. They cannot be RSOs if
they aren't the RSOs that created the SSA. When a SSP is completed and approved, an
ISSC is issued.
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Figure 2
Ship Security Plan According to the ISPS Code (Mazarheri, 2008).

2.6.3 Ship Security Officer (SSO)
The SSO is responsible for guaranteeing the ship's safety, which includes the execution
and maintenance of the SSP. Collaboratively, port security officers work closely with
the CSO. When it comes to the ship administrator, it must be plainly indicated whether
the SSO will also be the captain.

Figure 3
Officer in Charge of Ship Security in Accordance With the ISPS Code
(Mazarheri, 2008).
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2.6.4 Port Facility Security Assessment (PFSA)
A PFSA is undertaken to determine which areas of a port facility are most susceptible
to attack. You need to take into consideration all possible risks while planning a trip.
Consider the vulnerability of each target, as well as how each attack will affect them.
The assessment must take into account the following factors:
1. An evaluation of the critical resources and facilities that must be safeguarded.
2. Before designing and prioritizing security measures for assets and
infrastructures, it is necessary to identify potential dangers, their chances of
occurring, and their effects.
3. Find out which procedures and countermeasures are most effective in reducing
the risk of infection, and then prioritize them.
4. Human mistakes may lead to system and process flaws that can be discovered

and fixed. When it comes to PFSA implementation at ports located on its
territory, the CG has the requirement to outsource this task to an RSO. The
PFSA, like the SSA, will have to be revaluated and revised on a regular basis
to accommodate changes to port infrastructure.

Figure 4
Assessment of Port Facility Security in Accordance With the ISPS Code
(Mazarheri, 2008).
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2.6.5 Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP)
Port security measures must be in place before construction can begin on the facility
itself. There are safeguards in the PFSP in case of a security event at the port facility
or with respect to the ships, crewmembers, cargo, cargo transport units, and ship stores.
This position is in charge of ensuring that the port's security strategy is continually
updated and revised (Moth, 2004).
An RSO may be delegated PFSP approval by the Contracting Government. As
with ship security, the RSOs that developed the PFSA are unable to participate in the
PFSP approval procedure for the same reasons.

Figure 5
Port Facility Security Plan According to the ISPS Code (Mazarheri, 2008).

2.6.6 Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO)
When it comes to executing, modifying, and maintaining the PFSP, it's the PFSO's job
to serve as a go-between between SSOs and CSOs.
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Figure 6
Port Facility Security Officer According to the ISPS Code (Mazarheri,2008).

2.6.7 Company Security Officer (CSO)
SSA and the formulation, approval, and implementation of the SSP are all the
responsibility of the ship owner or corporation, who must appoint an onshore CSO to
carry out these duties. In addition, they are the go-to people for any PFSO or SSO
concerns.
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Figure 7
Officer in Charge of Security for the Company in Accordance With ISPS
(Mazarheri,2008).

2.7

Security Levels

Levels 1 to 3 have been established for ships and port infrastructure to protect them
from various threats.
The contracting governments are in charge of ensuring that the port facilities and the
ship are kept secure at all times. There is a specific significance to each level:
1. Security level 1: A minimal level of protection is required at all times to
maintain public safety.
2. Security level 2: The length of time that additional security measures must be
kept in place to combat a heightened danger of a security occurrence.
3. Security level 3: In the event of an imminent security crisis, extra security
measures will be put in place for a short amount of time, although it may not
be feasible to ascertain precisely who the intended target is.
When docking near one another, both the ship and the port infrastructure must
be safeguarded to the same degree. That is why ships cannot dock if one party is
less secure than the other, failing to do so might result in the ship being refused
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permission to dock. The facility will receive a Declaration of Security (DOS) from
the ship before it is allowed to dock.

2.8

Maritime Security

Any person, community, object, country, or organization that is vulnerable and
valuable may benefit from the term "security," which refers to the degree of resistance
to damage or protection from harm. (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2016). According
to the IMO:
The state or condition of being protected from harm; freedom from danger,
fear, or anxiety and the measures taken to guard against espionage or sabotage,
crime, and attack in relation to the ocean or any other navigable water body are
all definitions of maritime security. (p. 683).
It's impossible to define maritime security in terms of maritime security operations
since there are no clear definitions for it. It's the government's job to take care of it.
The choice to act on behalf of a state is a sovereign one, with a range of alternatives
available to the decision maker. As a result, maritime coordination is greatly affected.
In light of its wide range of policy areas, there is no one legal definition for it. Maritime
security consists of the following:
1. International and national security and peace.
2. Political independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty.
3. Security of Communication Lines at Sea.
4. Protection from maritime crimes at sea.
5. Access to resources at sea and on the seabed, as well as resource security.
6. Environmental safeguards or protection.
7. All seafarers and fishermen's safety.
All governments have a duty to ensure marine security by signing the
UNCLOS or by adhering to this wide-ranging collection of rules and regulations.
Compliance with UNCLOS must be ensured or enforced in crucial circumstances by
all marine regimes that are founded on this fundamental treaty or arise from this
instrument, whether they may be regional or local.
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2.8.1 The Importance of Nigerian Maritime Security
The importance of Nigerian maritime security is concentrated on so many critical
aspects of national security. Every location's strategic significance is based on three
fundamental conditions: its position, or more precisely, its situation, the resources of
the place itself and the surrounding area, and its offensive and defensive military
might. (Igbokwe, 2012). Nigeria easily meets the first two prerequisites but falls short
on the third, which underpins the importance of its marine sector. According to other
experts, crucial military operations are carried out at sea, given the vast deployment of
aircraft carriers, submarines, and radar-controlled naval operations in all seven seas of
the world (Fritelli, 2004). This aims to establish the maritime sector's political, social,
and economic contributions to global growth.
Nigeria's marine resources are without a doubt the most powerful and
dynamic of all its resources, including oil, gas, minerals, and agriculture. Its mineral
resources and other extractive industries, agricultural products both consumptive and
cash crops, have not provided any competition to the maritime sector's potential and
measurable productivity. It could also be argued that the ultimate contribution of the
oil and gas industry to the Nigerian economy cannot be compared to the maritime
industry, given the comprehensive and projected alternatives as a source of global
energy. This is due to the fact that the extraction of oil and gas, as well as its production
and transportation via pipelines, is becoming an off-shore activity in the maritime
domain.

2.8.2 Types of Maritime Security Activities
The world's marine security operations may be divided into three categories.
Specifically, the safety of the port, the vessel, and the facility (Wikipedia, 2016).


The defense, law, treaty enforcement and terrorist actions that lie within the
marine realm, and it involves the protection and inspection of goods traveling
vessels through ports, as well as maritime security (Greenberg, et al.,).
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Vessel Security – activities involving boats (such as ships and submarines) on
the international seas or in internal waterways are covered by this section of
the legislation (Department of Homeland Security, 2015).



Facility Security - offshore and waterside facilities, such as floating oil stations,
etc., are the focus of this section's activity (American Fuel and Petroleum
Manufacturers, 2015).

2.9

Piracy

A gang of thieves aims to profit by stealing everything of value from a ship, including
cash and personal goods as well as cargo and the ship and her crew (Murphy, 2008).
Piracy occurs in ports, anchorages, and the open ocean (Banlaoi, 2005). On top of all
this, he said that pirates may be anyone from opportunistic fisherman and simple
criminals to members of sophisticated Asian crime syndicates. He was right. Piracy
may take many forms in these scenarios, from the typical high-seas boarding and
hijacking of a commerce ship to the more usual practice of stealing from a ship when
it is moored.
There is no greater danger to sailors' lives than piracy at sea. Threatens
maritime and international commerce, as well as fundamental human rights to move
freely and securely. Because shipping accounts for more than 80% of all global
commerce, this is clearly an assault on the world economy (Igbokwe, 2015).
Petty theft and/or violence on the high seas is another way to characterize maritime
piracy. Murder is typically a part of this kind of activity. Arm robbery conducted inside
the territorial seas of the flag state and under the authority of that state is closely linked
with this crime.
Article 101 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea states that piracy
includes the following acts:
Any act of violence or detention prohibited by international law committed by the crew
or passengers of a private ship or aircraft with the intent to harm another person's
property:
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(i) in the open ocean, against another ship or aircraft or the people or property on board
that ship or aircraft.
(ii) People or property in areas beyond the jurisdiction of any state.
(b) Participation in the operation of a ship or aircraft while being aware of the
conditions that define it as a pirate ship or aircraft. As described in this Article, a pirate
act consists of five different elements:
(1) A violent act that can include assault, rape, or murder.
(2) On the high seas, or in a location beyond the authority of any State, a crime.
(3) Ship-to-ship combat, including mutiny and barratry, but excludes those acts.
(4) Terrorism and environmental harm are not included in private acts of sabotage.
(5) When the crew or passengers of a privately owned ship take action to prevent an
assault by a navy vessel.
2.9.1 Causes of Piracy
Modern-day maritime piracy has its roots in factors such as long-term unemployment,
a lack of legal penalties, and a general lack of opportunity. As a result, piracy is
becoming an increasingly popular alternative for individuals who live in areas with
high levels of it. Chronic unemployment is a common problem in developing nations.
Desperate people may choose piracy as a life because they cannot meet their own or
their family' fundamental necessities.
Destabilization caused by Somalia's civil conflict both harmed genuine
fishermen and provided opportunities for pirates because of a lack of legitimate
authority. As a result, a large number of fishermen and other seafarers turned become
pirates.
Jurisdiction is sometimes to blame for the difficulty in prosecuting pirates and
discouraging others who are considering it. This makes it difficult to prosecute pirates
because of the nature of piracy, which permits them to perform their crimes in
international seas. Others pirates are prosecuted in the nations they call home, while
some are prosecuted in the countries where their ships go.
Piracy is also fuelled by social acceptability. Because of the financial benefits
pirates provide to their communities, they are often lauded as heroes in
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underdeveloped regions. In reality, the bulk of the gains frequently go to third-party
financiers, thus this might be deceptive. Piracy may be attributed to seven different
causes (Murphy, 2012):
(1) Legal and jurisdictional flaws.
(2) A favourable geographical location.
(3) Disturbance and conflict.
(4) Inadequate law enforcement and security.
(5) Political environments that are permissive.
(6) Cultural acceptance/maritime tradition.
(7) Reward promise.
There is a common thread running across all of these factors: piracy flourishes
when governments are incapable or unwilling to deal with it. Pirates take advantage of
a state's shortcomings and enjoy the financial benefits as a result. In the past, piracy
was done by brigands who targeted unwary mariners for financial gain; this has not
altered in the present day (Murphy, 2012). These circumstances favour piracy, and
they will continue to do so for as long as they do.

2.9.2 Policy Actions Against Piracy in Nigeria
According to reports, US officials stated that the monitoring team has presented the
Security Council with two private cases that detail the flow of piracy proceeds through
international accounts, and a Somali businessman with British citizenship who is a
member of a piracy ring but also owns a counter-piracy company is singled out.
And perhaps as a result of this, it was claimed that despite the efforts of a
number of international task forces and a dozen national governments to combat
maritime piracy, significant legal challenges continue to prevent the arrest and
punishment of pirate leaders and kingpins (James & Wilson, 2009).
The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, which oversees
the country's shipping industry, is tasked with maintaining security in the nation's
coastal waterways. The government recently tasked NIMASA with maintaining law
and order in the nation's coastal waterways as well as those of several regions in the
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Benin Republic. This was done to reduce the threat posed by pirates in the West
African sub region.
But the issue still stands: How will NIMASA be able to do its duties without
being compromised given the extent of corruption in the country's security system?
Oyewole Olugbenga Leke, senior special assistant to the president of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria on maritime services, described some government initiatives to
combat piracy in Nigerian coastal waters in his speech at the maritime summit in
London, United Kingdom, in 2011. He said: "Having identified the root cause of and
depth of piracy in Nigeria and West Africa, the government of Nigeria has embarked
on sustained security and policy measures to discourage piracy."
He then identified the following steps to take in that direction:
(a) To make sure Nigerian ports adhere to the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) code, the government established a presidential implementation
committee on marine security and safety in 2004.
(b) According to him, NIMASA has achieved Zero piracy attack level in the Lagos
Pilotage district through strict vigilance over the past seven months.
(c) Through its unwavering vigilance, the Military Joint Task Force (JTF), which was
established to combat militancy in the Niger Delta region, has continued to reduce
pirate incidences there.
(d) To respond to acts of piracy and carry out police duties, the Marine Police has
acquired around 80 armoured patrol boats over the past three years.
(e) To aid in the development of the area, President Olusegun Obasanjo established
the Niger Delta Development Commission in 2000.
(f) The Amnesty programme was introduced in 2009 by the late Umar Musa Yar
Adua's administration in an effort to appease the Niger Delta's youth.
(g) The Nigerian Ports Authority has recently issued information to mariners on the
government's designation of safeguarded lightering zones in each pilotage area.
(h) Through the Inland Waterways Authority, we have also started attempts to have a
data base for all small watercraft in Nigerian waters.
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(j) Regional initiatives for Africa's west coast are supported by the Gulf of Guinea
commission.
These are without a doubt enormous steps forward in the fight against piracy
in the GOG and the coastal waters of Nigeria. How successful can these initiatives be,
though?
A round peg is a tool, but when it is inserted into a square hole, it loses its
effectiveness. The safety of people and property along our coast won't ever be
guaranteed until the Nigerian government, especially the GOG, begins tackling the
core cause of piracy in the area.
We now face a two-pronged security problem, "the on-shore - off-shore
criminals," since it has been determined that the threat is closely related to onshore
criminals.

2.9.3 Nature and Extent of Piracy in the Nigerian Waters
Piracy is by no means a recent phenomenon in Nigeria, with piracy-related behaviour
affecting the country's coast and waterways since the early 1970s, despite its climb in
the IMB hotspots list (Uadiale, 2012).
According to the report, the increase in foreign commercial vessels calling on
Lagos, Apapa, Port Harcourt, and other major Nigerian ports began in the 1970s, with
the boom in Nigerian oil exports and the importation of various goods such as
processed food, alcohol, cigarettes, automobiles, and electronics.
However, the ports were unable to handle the sudden increase in
maritime traffic, resulting in significant delays near the harbour areas. Because of the
delays and inadequate security in port areas and onboard ships, local gangs have plenty
of opportunities to steal from and rob foreign vessels.
These assaults should be classified as "opportunities" rather than "organized
piracy." In the 1970s, lack of security and the availability of things to rob served as the
driving force. However, piracy in Nigeria has changed over the years, possibly as a
result of a change in the driving force.
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The pirates continue to assault despite the fact that they appear to be an
effective deterrent around the harbour and even while on patrol because they are
willing to engage even the coast guards in combat (Freedom & Hassan, 2009).
The shift has led to piracy activities like bunkering for international trade is organized
on a much larger scale and frequently occurs in conjunction with the forging of bills
of lading to inflate the amount of oil that has actually and legally been lifted for export
(Marc-Antoine, 2012).
In his opinion, piracy in all of its manifestations is unquestionably the domain
of marine experts, often with links on a global scale. However, since the majority of
Africans in the hinterland cannot swim, it appears that fewer urban armed robbers are
involved in offshore crimes.
Many of the pirates in and around Lagos are young males from coastal fishing
towns. The Niger Delta's marine pirates can also drive a speedboat and swim. Through
the so-called cult societies, which are mafias and student fraternities that derive their
philosophy from the marine environment, they communicate with gangsters on land,
which explains their intelligence (David, 2007).
This helps to explain why local gangs and some common fisherman could not
have developed the sophistication necessary to withstand navies and, in many cases,
carry out their operations successfully if they had not formed some sort of alliance
with security personnel.

2.9.4 Armed Robbery
UNCLOS 1982's definition of piracy was so restricted that the IMO has adopted the
phrase "piracy and armed robbery against ships." This means that any "unlawful act of
violence or detention or depredation or threat thereof" directed against a ship or against
people or property on board a ship that is within a state's jurisdiction over such offenses
is considered an act of "piracy" by the IMO to include armed attacks on ships. Armed
ship hijackings may also occur in territorial seas, according to this definition. For this
reason, it is considered an act of pirating, since the perpetrator uses violence to take
something from another person's hands.
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2.9.5 Terrorism
Maritime terrorism, in contrast to other forms of maritime crime, was a relatively
recent development in the shipping sector. Terrorist attacks at sea are not a new
phenomenon, but they have not been widely covered. The kidnapping of a Greek cargo
at Karachi in 1974 was a high-profile maritime terrorist act, as noted by (Raymond,
2005). The 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro off the coast of Egypt by a
terrorist organization was the event that first brought maritime terrorism to the
attention of the world community.
Maritime terrorism is any illegal use or threatened use of force or violence
against peoples or property to compel or frighten governments or society, generally to
accomplish political, religious or ideological goals (Snoddon, 2007). Any criminal act
against ships, their passengers, cargo or crew, or against sea ports with the intention
of directly or indirectly influencing a government or groups of persons for political
goals is defined as maritime terrorism (Raymond, 2005). From these criteria, it is
evident that piracy and maritime terrorism are not only distinct occurrences, but they
are also related. Pirates, on the other hand, do not engage in maritime terrorism; they
instead engage in private gain. On the other hand, the fact that a terrorist organization
might use piracy to make money to sustain its terrorist activities connects the two.

2.9.6 Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria
Terrorism in Nigeria has been blamed on a number of issues by experts and academics.
Corruption, poverty, unemployment, religious fanaticism, and illiteracy are among
these issues. Terrorism has enveloped Nigerian culture in recent years, and it's hard to
keep up. This is the result of the State's repeated inability to offer effective leadership
and to distribute the benefits of good governance to its citizens.
Terrorism's roots may be traced back to economic and political concerns.
Official corruption, it is said, is to blame for Nigeria's economic hardship, political
marginalization, discontent, and acts of civil disobedience. Good governance is denied
to Nigerians if public officials and politicians at federal, state, and local levels
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embezzle public monies earmarked to develop schools and hospitals as well as provide
essential social amenities like water and electricity. Those under the age of 25 are
particularly vulnerable to social, psychological, and economic hardships. "Frustration,
dejection, and despair remain a daily reality in the life of the kids," (Adeyemo &
Adeyemi, 2012). Indoctrination into criminal and terrorist acts is rather simple for
them. It's a price we have to pay for creating a "reserved army" of disillusioned and
disillusioned young people due to the corruption of government officials and a broken
federal system, among other things.
Terrorists may carry out maritime assaults because of circumstances similar
to those that encourage piracy (Murphy, 2012).
The following are conducive elements for maritime terrorism:
(1) Opportunities Legal and jurisdictional matters.
(2) The necessity of geography.
(3) Inadequate security measures.
(4) Secure base areas.
(5) Traditions of the maritime industry.
(6) Leadership that is charismatic and effective.
(7) Support from the state.
(8) The promise of a reward.
There are many similarities between these situations and piracy, but the
reasons for exploiting them are different. To terrorists, the maritime domain is just a
tool for achieving their political goals on land. Terrorism has always been and will
continue to be a type of violence aimed at effecting political change.
2.9.7 Corruption
Generally, corruption can be defined as the intentional or accidental violation of ethics
and codes designed to regulate the conduct of a profession, a public service, private
transactions, contractual agreements, and actions resulting in selfish or dishonest
personal gains at the expense of other individuals, a system, and society. There are
several ways in which a person might abuse their position of power, such as using it
for oppressive or repressive objectives, as well as victimization, election fraud,
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bribery, diversion of public money, and contract inflation among many others.
Corruption may also occur when a person fails to carry out his or her
responsibilities. Dissatisfaction, deprivation, crime, and terrorism may all result from
a combination of these factors. It's unfortunate that when we think of corruption, the
first things that come to mind are crimes like embezzlement and bribery, money
laundering, and kickbacks. Considering our familiarity with the effects and
relationships between the lack of public goods and the diversion of funds for selfish
purposes, it may be the case. For the sake of brevity, suffice it to say that there are
countless episodes of high-profile corruption in Nigeria, including Gen. Babangida's
regime's infamous $12.'4billion oil money theft from the central bank accounts
(Uadiale, 2012). More than a dozen high-profile corruption cases, including the
pension scam, the fuel subsidy scam, and the aviation scandal, have been put on hold
while investigations and prosecutions have been put on hold. It's all because of poor
leadership. Corruption is not limited to stealing public funds; it has a negative impact
on the rule of law, economic growth, and public confidence in government and its
leaders. Mass poverty is exacerbated by corruption. According to the NBS data for
2014, 70% of Nigerians live on less than $1.00 a day, which means they cannot afford
basic necessities including food, clothes, healthcare, and shelter.
More than 20 million Nigerians are unemployed, according to the NBS 5.3
million jobless young people and an average of 1.8 million newly graduated workers
are included in this calculation (Sun news online, June 3, 2014). At 77.7% and 76.3%,
respectively, the 2010 poverty rates for the North West and North East are the highest
in the country (Adeyemo & Adeyemi, 2012).
Corruption, unemployment, and poverty all go hand in hand, as does
terrorism. Terrorist groups may easily recruit huge numbers of jobless young people
to serve as foot soldiers. It is our teeming youngsters who are prone to terrorism and
crime due to unemployment and poverty.
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2.9.8 Insurgency
An insurgency is a long-term political-military action that aims to seize a country's
resources through irregular armed troops and unlawful political groups (Hansen,
2009). Insurgents fight alongside the country's conventional armed forces as part of a
guerrilla war. They might deploy the tactics of piracy and terrorist attacks to further
their cause in an unusual military battle. A well-coordinated insurgency is defined for
the purposes of this study, therefore, as a movement that uses subversion and violent
struggle to gain autonomy for specific geographical regions from an established
government.

2.9.9 Stowaway
Stowaway is a term used to describe a person who sneaks on a ship without permission
from the ship's owner or master, and stays on board as the ship sets sail. Shipping
firms, particularly those operating in West Africa, Central America, Colombia,
Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic, are concerned about stowaways. Beyond the
vessel's trading patterns, this hazard is linked to the vessel and/or cargo type and
includes crew training and knowledge in regards to security issues. The vast majority
of stowaways are discovered on cargo ships carrying containers, bulk goods, and other
types of cargo.
A stowaway episode may have a negative impact on all parties (port, ship,
and marine businesses) as well as the country's reputation. The expense and danger of
stowaways have prompted shipping corporations to be more vigilant. It's possible that
shipping companies may stop using the port if they continue to pay fines for
stowaways. The port's revenue may be impacted as a result. Everyone who relies on
the port for their livelihood would be adversely impacted. All parties involved in
marine business should applaud efforts to combat the stowaway problem.

2.10

Theoretical Framework

This inquiry will be guided by the Routine Activity Theory and the FrustrationAggression Theory.
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2.10.1 The Routine Activity Theory
The RAT may be used to examine piracy and other marine security challenges within
the maritime environment (Essien & Adongoi 2015). The RAT was developed in 1979
by Lawrence Colhen and Marcus Felson as an offshoot of socio-structural theory
reviewed that three factors have resulted in the relaxation of marine security hurdles
(Essien & Adongoi, 2015).
i.

Criminals may be attracted to these individuals.

ii.

An ideal target must have something of value that is easy to transport in the
aquatic environment.

iii. A crime cannot be prevented if there are not enough qualified maritime
security personnel on the scene. According to RAT's proposals, pirate attacks
in Nigeria's maritime domain can be explained, as well as the challenges they
pose to maritime security. The most frequent targets of kidnappings have been
fishing boats, oil tankers, non-oil transporters, and multinational oil
installations. (Essien. & A. Adognio 2015). Using the regular activity idea,
this hypothesis claims that pirate attacks have continued. Insufficient marine
security measures and a lack of skilled security personnel/network to
safeguard the maritime industry must be taken into consideration carefully. A
large number of young people are either unemployed or underemployed and
are seeking for strategies to find jobs that they are both satisfied with. During
the past several years, these variables have fueled pirate assaults in Nigerian
waters and the GOG (Essien & Adongio, 2015).
Crime and security causality cannot be explained by traditional sociological theories
such as the regular activity hypothesis. The major goal of the law is to prevent
criminals and weaken security measures by enforcing the norms of ordinary life
(Igbokwe, 2015).
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2.10.2 Frustration-Aggression Theory (FAT)
The FAT was conceived in 1939 by John Dollard. This article provides a rationale for
violence. This hypothesis, which seeks to explain violent behaviors like pirate raids
and terrorist attacks, states: "Aggression is the result of stopping or defeating an
individual's effort to attain a goal." Frustration comes in when a goal is postponed or
not accomplished while the initiator is still in the game (Greenberg et al., 2008).
Hostility is typically directed against or transferred to the source of
dissatisfaction. Aggression is defined as the purposeful inflicting of damage on a living
entity or a substitute for it (Greenberg et. al., 2008). Depending on the cause of one's
ire, one's aggression might be directed against anybody or anything. Social movements
are formed when a group of people gets outraged. There are two types of annoyance:
absolute and relative. It is absolute if a person does not have enough to live, and
relative if they have but are less fortunate than their neighbours. Piracy and robbery
are examples of action that harms someone else, and the same concepts apply to both
(Uadiale, 2012).

2.11

Legal Framework

2.11.1 Legal Background of International Maritime Organization
A wide variety of marine safety laws exist across the globe, including the MTSA,
which was implemented by the United States government in response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 and outlines sweeping new powers for combating
terrorism in U.S. maritime waters (Lyons, 2003).
It's interesting and significant in their separate nations, but these rules can
only be enforced inside those borders. In response to this, the United Nations created
the IMO in 1948 (IMO, 2016).
This organization, the IMO, is in charge of maritime pollution prevention and
safety. For maximum safety, environmental protection, compliance with the law,
collaboration in the marine industry, and efficiency in the shipping industry only a
complete regulatory framework can provide. Among the requirements of the ISPS
Code for ships are:
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1.

Plans for the security of ships.

2.

Officers responsible for ship security.

3.

Officers responsible for company security.

4.

There is certain onboard equipment.
Port facilities are subject to the ISPS Code's legal framework, which includes

the following requirements:
1.

Security plans for port facilities.

2.

Officers responsible for security at port facilities.

3.

There are certain security requirements.
The following are additional requirements for ships and port facilities in

addition to those listed above:
1.

Access control and monitoring.

2.

Monitoring cargo and activities of people.

3.

Providing access to secure communications.

International Maritime Organization (IMO). For marine safety and security and
efficiency, states work together with the IMO in an effort to attain the highest realistic
standards possible. Liability and compensation systems, as well as international marine traffic
facilitation, are some of the topics that are addressed. Technical help in marine affairs is
another duty of the organization.

The IMO is in charge of holding international conferences and developing
international conventions or agreements on maritime issues. For the time being, the
focus is on making sure the nations who have ratified these agreements are doing all
they can to put them into effect.
As of 1958, the Geneva Convention on the International Maritime
Organization has been in effect, following its signing in 1948. It was held in London
in 1959 that the inaugural meeting of the IMO was held. A few months after 22 May
1982 (the date of entry into effect of the changes to the IMO Convention), the
Organization's name changed to the IMCO.
•

Assembly
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•

Council

•

Committees

•

Secretariat
The IMO's executive body is the 40-member Council. For all the activities of

the Assembly save for providing recommendations to governments on matters of
marine safety and pollution control, the Council acts as the organization's watchdog
under the Assembly. Under article 15(j) of the Convention, Assembly members are
entrusted with this responsibility.
The Council of the IMO is also in charge of selecting the organization's
Secretary-General, who must be approved by the Assembly. Two-year terms begin
when each regular session of the Assembly is over. Three types of countries may run
for membership in the UN:


Category A, for international shipping, there are ten nations that have the most
interest



In Category B, there are ten other states that have a strong interest in
international seaborne trade



Categories A and B do not allow for the election of 20 nations that have a
particular interest in marine transportation or navigation, but the election of
these states will guarantee that all significant regions in the globe are
represented.
All committees of the IMO are available to all member states on an equal

footing, regardless of membership.
The Maritime Safety Committee. The IMO Convention created it. The IMO's
highest technical body is the IMO Technical Committee. Subsidiary bodies handle the
bulk of the organization's responsibilities. Security at sea, flag state implementations,
navigational safety, and radio communications are only some of the issues that the
MSC works with. There are other issues like ship design, equipment, and fire
protection, as well as standards for watch keeping and crew training that the MSC
deals with.
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The Committee on Marine Environmental Protection. IMO initiatives for
the prevention and management of maritime pollution from ships were coordinated by
the IMO in 1973. Representatives of non-IMO nations that are parties to treaties
connected to Committee activities, as well as all IMO members, are welcome to
participate. In 1982, the Committee was formally established. In addition to the
Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee, there
are nine subcommittees that are available to the Member States.
The Legal Committee. Founded in 1967, it was charged with drafting
international agreements and other treaty instruments for submission to the Council of
the International Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). This practice was
formally codified in 1982. Damage caused by dangerous and toxic chemicals, the
clearance of shipwrecks, and the claims of seafarers are some of the topics covered.
The Technical Cooperation Committee. Set up in 1969, the IMO's maritime
aid program for developing nations (especially ships and ports) was established to
define rules and directives, monitor the program's progress, and assess its outcomes.
In 1984, it was made official.
The Facilitation Committee. When ships are entering or exiting ports or other
terminals, it is responsible for lowering the formalities and streamlining the paperwork
needed for ships. It was created in 1972. It was made official on December 7, 2008,
when the 1991 changes to the IMO Convention came into effect. An international
treaty, created by the London Convention in 1972, governs garbage dumping into the
ocean. The IMO serves as the secretariat for this treaty and works as a coordinating
body for its implementation. The average number of times a group meets for
consultation each year is four to six. After being ratified in 1996, a Protocol modifying
the Convention was finally put into effect on March 24th, 2006. The Protocol, which
is intended to eventually replace the Convention, has now been ratified by 37
countries.
Nigerian Maritime Institutions and Institutional Development (NMID). Nigeria's
marine industry has contributed significantly to the country's economy, with the
establishment of many maritime-related organizations. There are a number of
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maritime-related training and education programs at these universities, including those
for seafarers and engineers. These institutions include the Nigerian Institute of
Transport Technology, Lagos, the Nigerian Institute of Transport Technology, Zaria,
and a slew of others.
Additionally, there is the NSC, which serves to safeguard and promote the
interests of Nigerian shippers and to promote shipping procedures that are consistent
with international norms. For the coordination and implementation of Nigeria's
shipping policy and matters related to it, the NPA and its subsidiaries, the Nigerian
Navy, and the NCHCL. Having these institutions in Nigeria today would not have been
possible without maritime transportation, which is why the country's maritime sector
and economy have profited greatly from their existence.
Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA). As the
country's most important maritime regulatory and promotional body, NIMASA has a
significant role to play. On August 1st, 2006, the National Maritime Authority and the
Joint Maritime Labour Industrial Council (both previously parastatals of the Federal
Ministry of Transport) merged to establish the new body.
The Agency is tasked with overseeing Nigeria's maritime sector, and it must
do so by using the appropriate tools.


The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act of 2007.



The Merchant Shipping Act of 2007 and



The Coastal and Inland Shipping (Cabotage) Act of 2003 governs inland and
coastal shipping.
The primary function of the agency was to regulating maritime safety,

security standards and maritime labour, maritime regulation, promoting commercial
shipping and cabotage operations, as well as preventing and controlling marine
pollution, the organization was created to administer maritime safety, seafarers'
standards, and security, and maritime labour.
In addition, the IMO and ILO Conventions and Protocols are implemented by
the Agency in the country of origin. Specific duties and responsibilities were outlined
under the NIMASA Act, 2007 in Section 22 of Part IV.
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i.

Promote the development of the shipping industry and oversee issues related
to merchant shipping and seafarers as well as administering the registration and
licensing of ships.

ii.

Control and manage seafarers' certification.

iii.

Create maritime safety and training standards.

iv.

Enforce shipping safety laws governing shipbuilding and sailing.

v.

Conduct search and rescue operations.

vi.

Give instructions and guarantee adherence to vessel security measures.

vii.

Surveillance of the air and coastal areas.

viii.

Ensure that marine pollution is minimized and regulated.

ix.

Assist maritime laborers in obtaining certifications, training, employment, and
welfare benefits.

x.

Create and implement policies and initiatives that will encourage the expansion
of regional capability in ship ownership, crewing, and building, as well as other
marine infrastructure.

xi.

Ensure the enforcement and administration of the Cabotage Act 2003.

xii.

Assist with port and flag state duties.

xiii.

The receipt and removal of wrecks and

xiv.

Establish the process for carrying out ILO conventions and other international
treaties that Nigeria has ratified in relation to maritime labor, commercial
shipping, and safety and security at sea, as well as the execution of any rules,
resolutions, or circulars resulting from such treaties (Nigerian Maritime
Administration and Safety Agency Act, 2007 NIMASA, 2009).

Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA). There was a proposal to create a central port
management agency in Nigeria in the 1930s. It was not possible to organize because of the
onset of the Second World War (1934-1945). After a brief re-examination in August 1952, the
colonial authority's favorite project was re-examined. Furthermore, the government's
announcement in September 1953 on the creation of a new regulating agency for ports marked
the culmination of the project. The Nigerian House of Representatives enacted the Ports Acts
of 1954 on March 24, 1954. Onne, Tin Can Island, RoRo, Port Harcourt, Warri, and Calabar,
as well as the Federal Lighter Terminal at Onne were all part of NPA's network of eight main
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ports (excluding oil terminals) with combined cargo handling capacities of 35 million tons
annually before the reform process got under way (Akabogu, 2004).

Efforts to improve port efficiency began in 2003, and the landlord model was
adopted for all of Nigeria's ports by the government. 25 Terminals have been granted
to private terminal owners on long-term lease agreements of 10 to 25 years. Some of
the Authority's duties and responsibilities were transferred to the private sector as part
of this new framework. Some of its statutory duties are included here, as well:


Land and water within the port's boundaries are owned and administered by
the port.



Parts operational infrastructure of planning and development.



Setting a benchmark for port tariff structure and leasing and concessioning
infrastructure.



Operations and hydrographic survey related to nautical/harbour operations.



Pollution and incidents in the marine environment.



Maintaining a high level of security and safety in the common areas.



Monitoring and enforcing port regulations and byelaws.



Monitoring the day-to-day operations and ensuring compliance with relevant
provisions of the respective agreements.

Nigerian Shippers` Council (NSC). The Nigerian Shippers' Council was established in
1978, and the quality of shipping services had deteriorated and ocean freight charges had
increased unabated by foreign ship operators operating scheduled liner services to Nigerian
ports.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in a
document known as the UN Code for Liner Conferences proposed the creation of the
NSC in developing nations to limit the excesses of foreign ship owners and other
shipping service providers.
A Shippers' Council was recommended by UNCTAD for developing
countries, and Nigeria adopted this recommendation by creating a Shippers' Council
in 1978 through Nigerian Shippers' Council Act Cap. N133 LFN 2004. This Act was
later supplemented by two pieces of legislation, one dealing with funding and one
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dealing with shipping charges in Nigerian ports, to allow for the Council's proper
operation.
A major part of the role of the NSC is to guarantee the following


Importers and exporters may expect quick and cost-effective shipping service
delivery from shipping service providers.



expenses (freight, port fees, local shipping charges, haulage etc.) should be
moderated and stabilized.



The ability of different international trade practitioners at the macro and micro
levels to communicate and cooperate effectively.



Ongoing, dependable guidance to the federal government on issues pertaining
to international trade with Nigeria.

As of 1997, however, the Nigerian Shippers' Council and all of its sub-regional
equivalents extended their roles to include the full transportation chain, from origin to
destination.
Lastly, in February 2014, In order to alleviate the detrimental effects of port
concession activities on the economy because there was no economic regulator and to
maximize Nigeria's advantages from the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Nigerian
Shippers' Council was appointed the Port Economic Regulator. After the nomination
was confirmed by the President's Executive Order and the Ministerial Regulation,
1.

Nigerian Shippers’ Council (Port Economic Regulator) Order, 2015; and

2.

Nigerian Shippers’ Council (Port Economic) Regulations 2015.

National Inland Waterways Authority (NIWA). As a result of a law passed by the
National Assembly, Nigeria's inland waterway authority, the NIWA, was renamed to the IWD
and given main responsibility for improving and developing Nigeria's inland waterways for
navigation.

Out of Nigeria's 36 states, 20 states may be reached through the country's
interior waterways. Wetland regions along the nation's main rivers are critical to
agriculture. Waterways enable the transportation of agricultural goods from the middle
belt, notably Makurdi and Lafia, to Onitsha and Port Harcourt. For bulk freight
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transportation, Warri and Onitsha, a significant industrial/trade town on the Niger
River, both have waterways that serve Ajaokuta Steel Complex.
NIWA's strategy and policies include:


Improve the flow of navigation in the country's waterways by eliminating physical
obstacles.



Ensure that pricing policies are implemented that will shift traffic to inland

waterways.


NIWA, which is responsible for administering the waterways, should be
reorganized to allow private sector participation in the administration and
operation of the waterways.



Develop inland waterways as a transit method with the help of indigenous
people, and



The large number of major and small accidents on inland waterways may be
reduced by establishing an Inland Waterways Safety Inspectorate.

Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria (MWUN). Nigeria's Marine Workers Union serves
as an umbrella organization for all union members that are employed in the maritime industry
in Nigeria.

2.12

Empirical Reviews

Legal Analysis of the ISPS Code contains inherent weaknesses that might diminish its
efficacy. A typical problem is that the code is not binding, that it is not enforced, and
that it is not adhered to (Abdulsalam, 2021). It was difficult for Nigeria to put the
ISPS Code into action because of the country's limited enforcement capabilities and
ineffective coordination among the various government entities.
Shaw investigated the ISPS Code application at two Liberian ports, Monrovia
and Buchanan (2021). Buchanan, the capital of Liberia, and Monrovia are within
commuting distance. According to the study's results, a rise in the number of cargo
ships arriving at and departing from each port since the ISPS Code was implemented
has had a direct influence on the economies of both ports. For businesses, the National
Port Authority has become a more attractive site. As more ships arrive and depart the
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port, there are indications that the sea is becoming a more dynamic hub of activity.
More ship traffic at the port means a better economy for everyone. Since the
introduction of the ISPS Code, the economy has grown and prospered.
As a result of a lack of marine security expertise, customary practice, resources,
and financial commitment, the ISPS code was not properly implemented in Dakar
Senegal (Guas, 2020).
PT Pelindo II has been implementing SOLAS 1974 on Ship and Port Facility
Security Policy of ISPS Code since 2004, which includes the Ministry of
Transportation in Indonesia (Gunawan et al., 2019). The UN convention and
ministerial mandate need this policy, which is based on the ISPS Code, to ensure that
the port of Cirebon Branch, Indonesia, is the safest in the world. An important issue is
that no one has been properly educated on the procedure for implementing the ISPS
Code at PT Pelindo II (Cirebon Branch) and its related interim measures.
Port security threats can be assessed SPMS, but the system's success depends
on the Port Facility Security Officer and his or her assessment team taking into account
the entire port facility operation and not only focusing on the threat nature. It is
essential for PFSOs using the FCF Checklist to recognize their weaknesses and areas
for improvement in order to benefit from the checklist's recommendations for security
measures and procedures (Lee & Shah 2017).
There is an effort being made to apply the ISPS Code at Tema Fishing Harbour
utilizing the Tema Port's processes, structures, and measures study on the
implementation of the ISPS Code at the Tema Fishing Harbour (Ado 2015a). To be
fair to Tema Fishing Harbour, community involvement and the ISPS Code's narrow
scope have all conspired to thwart its implementation.
The Noncentrality Parameter of 3.2316 suggested that N=120 was adequate to
discriminate between groups with medium size differences before and after the
deployment of the ISPS Code (Heard, 2012). A statistically significant difference in
the number of stowaways before and after the introduction of the ISPS Code was found
(t = 42.47, t > 0.05). An increase in the number of reported stowaway events is
consistent with an overall decrease in this outcome, according to literary analysis and

39

the observed % change for most vessel classes. The number of Paris MOU security
weaknesses reported by member states (r = 0.44, R2 = 0.19) is positively linked with
the number of stowaways recorded.
Nigeria's adoption of the ISPS Code has had a significant influence on port
security and efficiency (Okoroji & Ukpere 2011). Code compliance has been a
challenge for the marine sector as a whole.
However, governments throughout the world have diverse interpretations of ISPS
Code's criteria, therefore the code doesn't give globally consistent standards or clear
guidance (Burmester, 2004). A number of issues have arisen, including
misunderstanding over the distinction between the ISPS Code Act enforced at national
level and ISPS Code that is laid forth by IMO, a lack of attention on ship/port interface,
minimal enforcement by the contracting government, and poor reaction to events.
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Chapter 3
3.1

Methodology

3.1.1 Research Scope
This study was conducted using ex-post facto and cross-sectional methods. Ex-post
facto research was employed since the data used in this study was not susceptible to
researcher tampering. A cross-sectional survey technique is used to gather data from a
subset of the population, which identifies events based on the frequency with which
they occur in natural clusters across time. This strategy has been employed in earlier
research, thus it was deemed suitable for this paper.

3.1.2 Population of the Study
There are a number of groups in Nigeria working to prevent and discourage unlawful
activities on the country's waterways, including NIMASA, NPA, NSC, the Nigerian
Shipping Council, PFSO, SSO, and CSO. Their cooperation with other law
enforcement authorities is likewise well-established. Given that it was written for
national governments; the ISPS Code includes private information that was not
previously accessible to the public at large. This probe was primarily concerned with
NIMASA and NPA personnel. As an alternative, I made contact with port facilities
security officers.

3.1.3 Method of Data Collection and Analysis
Objective 1: To assess the ISPS Code compliance of Nigerian port facilities.
Data: For Objective (I), secondary data collected over time was used.
Data collection: Port facilities that are in compliance with the ISPS Code was found
in the NIMASA yearly report database.
Data Analysis: Data obtained was analysed using ANOVA statistical technique with
the aid of SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software to show whether
there was variation in compliance across the years.
Objective 2: Evaluate port facilities with interface with the foreign vessels.
Data: Secondary data was used to meet Objective (II) over a certain period of time.
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Data collection: Objective (II) data gathered from the NIMASA yearly report
database for port facilities with foreign vessel interfaces.
Objective 3: Examine the challenges to the ISPS Code's implementation in Nigeria.
Data: The data for objective (III) is primary data using the questionnaire.
Data collection: The data for objective (III) was collected from the Nigerian Maritime
Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), the Nigerian Port Authority (NPA),
Port Facility Security Officers (PFSO) via the administered questionnaire.
Data analysis: Simple percentage and a bar chart was used to examine the challenges
encountered in the implementation of the ISPS Code.
Objective 4: Highlight lessons learnt from Implementation of ISPS code from
Neighbouring countries.
Data: Data for this objective is obtained by reviewing literatures on various countries.
3.2

Ethical Issues

At all instances, participants' informed consents and confidentiality were honoured
throughout the data gathering procedure and the data collection itself.

3.3

Limitations


People who are asked to participate in the online survey are required to accept.



The project's inability to locate relevant data is hampered significantly by the
challenge of gaining access to it.

3.4

Reliability of the Sampling Instrument

The questionnaire's reliability was tested using the test-retest approach. The
dependability of the questionnaire was tested by twenty stakeholders, including 10
maritime professionals, ten public affairs analysts, and others who were acquainted
with the Nigerian coast. They were chosen because they share many of the features of
the study's prospective participants. Participants were given 20 surveys, and the same
participants were re-assessed two weeks later using identical questions. The
instrument's reliability was tested by comparing results from the first and second
administrations of the questionnaire using Pearson Product Moment Correlation. For
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the second time, Cronbach’s alpha was employed to assess the questionnaire's interitem and inter-scale reliability. SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) version
20 was used to conduct this statistical analysis (i.e. Pearson Product Moment
Correlation and Cronbach alpha). The research relied on questionnaires having a
reliability coefficient of at least 0.70.
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Chapter 4
4.1

Results and Discussion

4.1.1 Compliance Level of Nigerian Port Facilities with the ISPS Code.
The goal of this part is to assess the degree to which port facilities adhere to the ISPS
code. By looking at the number of ports that have met the ISPS code over the last five
years, this was done. The frequency of usage of Port facilities that were found to be
compliant during the year under consideration are summarized in Table 1. The ISPS
Code compliance is verified by regular audits by the port administration and the port
operator. 74 ports in Nigeria (Lagos, Calabar, Warri, and Port Harcourt) had 47
(63.5%) of their facilities comply with the ISPS code in 2017, according to data in
Table 1. Only 46 (59.0%) port facilities out of 78 met the ISPS Code's requirements
in 2018. As of 2019, 63 (79.7%) of the nation's 79 port facilities were in compliance
with ISPS regulations. In 2020, 39 (58.2%) out of 67 ports' facilities met the ISPS
Code's requirements. Only 37 (61.7%) of the 60 ports tested in 2021 were ISPScompliant. Only 232(64.8%) out of 358 ports were found to be in compliance with the
ISPS standards between 2017 and 2021 in Nigeria.
In addition, Table 1 was subjected to a statistical test to determine whether
there were significant variations in the level of compliance across the years. Findings
from the ANOVA result on Table 2 revealed that there was no significant variation in
the level of compliance of port facilities across the years as the p-value (0.977)
obtained is greater than the critical level of α = 0.05. This simply implies that the level
of port facilities compliance with the ISPS Code in Nigeria across the year is the same.

44

Table 1
A 5−Year Average of Level of Port Facilities in Compliance With the ISPS Code
Category
Total Number of
Port Facilities in
Compliance
Total Number of
Port Facilities Not
Compliant

2017

Total

2018 2019 2020

2021

Total

%

47

46

63

39

37

232

64.8%

27

32

16

28

23

126

35.2%

74

78

79

67

60

358

100

Note: NIMASA Data Base Summary (2017-2021)

Table 2
ANOVA Table (Port Facilities)
Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Between Groups

128.600

4

32.150

.103

.977

Within Groups

1561.000

5

312.200

Total

1689.600

9

Note: SPSS output, 2022
4.1.2 Challenges to the ISPS Code's Implementation in Nigeria
In this part, the difficulties of implementing the ISPS code in Nigeria were examined.
Governments signing the ISPS Code must appoint authority to carry out their security
obligations and to delegate specific tasks to authorized RSOs. NMASA, the Nigerian
Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, has been named as the country's official
authority. However, in order to achieve their goals, they must collaborate with other
sister organizations. To ensure a smooth transition to the ISPS Code at all Nigerian
terminals and ports, the NPA has taken a lead role in this effort. As a result of these
considerations, the researcher devised a questionnaire to gather the thoughts of
NIMASA and NPA workers on the application of the ISPS Code in Nigeria from their
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perspectives. A respectable response rate of 167 replies from NIMASA, NPA, and
PFSOs out of a total of 200 questionnaires were obtained. The results of the surveys
were utilized to identify the difficulties in achieving this goal. Table 3 summarizes the
frequency of replies.

Table 3
Challenges Encountered in the Implementation of the ISPS Code in Nigeria
Challenges

ISPS Code

%

Poor Funding

81

49

Bad Management

15

9

Corruption

11

7

Government Interference

10

6

Infrastructure Deficiency

24

14

Inadequate Modern Technology

12

7

Sabotage

14

8

Total

167

100

Note: Researchers Field Survey, 2022

Regulators and administrators at NIMASA, NPA and the PFSO expressed their
concerns about obstacles faced during Nigeria's ISPS code implementation in Table 3.
59% of respondents cited inadequate funding as the most significant obstacle to
implementing the ISPS code; 14% cited infrastructure deficiencies; 9% blamed poor
management; 8% blamed deliberate sabotage; 7% blamed corruption; and 6% blamed
interference from the government.
Poor Funding. As a result of inadequate financing for the majority of the nation's
ports, the maritime industry has struggled to satisfy the requirements of the IMO. Since
the establishment of the codes, the country has been unable to overcome this problem.
According to the new requirements set by these agencies, ports must be able to
spend considerably in new technology and security apparatus to maintain proper

46

monitoring of their ports. It has become more difficult to meet these objectives for
technical improvement since ports are owned and financed by the government in
conjunction with the private sector under a PPP framework. The government's
bureaucracy just makes issues worse.

Bad Management. The majority of Nigeria's government entities have been plagued
by poor management. People with no nautical training or experience have been
selected to operate Nigerian ports because of the inherent flaws in Nigerian culture. In
order to maintain the safety and security of the ports, they are unable to properly
prioritize their tasks. The basic objective of the ISPS Code and its execution have been
largely undermined by this predicament.

Corruption. Corruption has prevented the country's ports from getting the security
and safety equipment they need, as it does in every other area of the country. The
selection of management employees, the recruitment of port workers, and the activities
of MARPOL and other security organizations in the ports are all examples of
corruption.

Government Interference. The fact that the government owns and implements policy
frameworks that control the operations of the ports has an impact on the
professionalism of the operators. As a result of government interference, the
management personnel, financing decisions for the acquisition of security equipment,
and the regulations and decrees that regulate the operations of the ports are all affected.
This intervention harms the quality of the workforce, the freedom needed by the sector
to make professional judgments, and many more.

Inadequate Modern Technology. Virtually every component in this study has an
impact on the lack of suitable contemporary equipment, but the low financing of the
ports stands out. There is a lack of current equipment at Nigerian ports to fight and
combat

modern,

sophisticated

criminal
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networks

that

exploit

technology

advancements in a manner that makes present equipment and arrangements appear
ancient. Due to the lack of sophisticated monitoring technology, for example,
contrabands continue to flow through the country's ports, only to be discovered upon
arriving at the ports of call.

Sabotage. Port security must not be disregarded due to deliberate efforts by certain
parties and people to undermine it certain people plan to weaken the security network
at the ports on a regular basis in order to get their contraband through the borders for
questionable motives. It is very uncommon for members of these organizations to have
positions in the country's policy-making echelons, which may hinder the efforts of port
managers to achieve ISPS criteria.

4.1.3 Lessons Learnt from Implementation of ISPS Code in Neighbouring
Countries
This section revealed the effectiveness and compliance level of the ISPS code in
neighboring countries such as Togo, Ghana, Bene Republic, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Cameroon and South Africa from literatures.

Togo. In Togo, the ISPS Code appears to be in effect in that it requires visitors to
declare their purpose before entering any port zone. In exchange for an identity card,
the visitor receives a badge with a letter and the designated colour for the zone. There
are various security gates to go through if the tour covers port facilities.
An official port pass is also required for bicycles, lorries, and private
automobiles. Taxis and motorcycle taxis are prohibited from entering the port.
The ISPS Code stipulates that each facility be managed by a qualified port
facility security officer, that a government-approved security plan be in place, and that
regular exercises and drills be conducted in an effort to increase port security.
According to the port authorities, each of their facilities has a declaration of
conformity, which means that it complies with the ISPS Code's requirements.
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Ghana. The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code compliance by ports
and vessels will aid in containing the growing threat of piracy against Ghanaian ships
in the Gulf of Guinea, the harbour master of the Tema Port (Mica, 2021).
In response to the SOLAS Convention (1974/1988) on Maritime Security, the
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code has been amended.
It went into effect in 2004 and lays out duties for governments, shipping firms,
crew members on board, and staff members at ports and facilities, including
"Preventing security incidents pertaining to ships or ports used in international trade
by detecting security threats and taking preventative measures."
The ISPS code stands tall as a method of preventing piracy on the Eye on Port
program (Captain Micah, 2021).
However, the quick to point out that the ISPS code alone is not the entire
answer to the problem of piracy as intelligence gathering, logistics, such as helicopters
and gunships, as well as the provision of outside support during times of vessel hijacking by pirates, are also necessary to keep ships and crew members safe (Captain
Micah, 2021).

Benin Republic. The IMO reviewed the status of the implementation of SOLAS
chapter XI-2 and ISPS Code in order to thoroughly analyse the actions and
arrangements adopted by Benin for the purpose of creating and implementing a
national maritime security plan.
The Benin's government supports the concept of Action de l'Etat en Mer
(AEM), a French approach to marine affairs that encompasses all government agencies
with the appropriate resources and jurisdiction in the maritime domain.

Democratic Republic of Congo. IMO assessed the ports of Matadi, Boma, and
Banana with an emphasis on operational and physical security issues to ascertain the
national-level procedures and arrangements necessary for implementing, verifying
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compliance with, and enforcing the provisions of the SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the
ISPS Code.

Cameroon. Additionally, the Douala port is not yet ISPS-code compliant. The port
unveiled a container-scanning equipment in 2006. New automated customs processes
entered into operation at the start of 2007. The authorities predict that it will still take
some time to get off the ISPS Code blacklist, though.
The change in channel depths caused by river silting in a relatively narrow
channel is one of the main issues when approaching/departing Douala. Additionally,
badly oriented buoys are frequently linked to navigational issues.
For Douala, no maritime forecasts are published.
The list of issues, which is ostensibly not full, simply serves to highlight the
Port of Douala's general inefficiency.
However, it is crucial to keep in mind that the AHP evaluation presented in this
study compares the port of Douala to nearby ports in the Central African sub region
(Ports which may have comparable issues and positions).

South Africa. The introduction of the ISPS Code has had an effect on port operations
specifically in both positive and bad ways, according to Transnet National Port
Authority, a division of Transnet SOC Ltd.
Positive effects on port operations:


Consistency in marine security due to standardization of security policies and
processes with Regulations 2004 requirements.



The way the vessel clearance procedure is handled has improved.



A reduction in crime rates at the ports as a result of tighter security controls
and access restrictions.



Improving coordination between state security, emergency services, and
port/facility security.
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As a result of traffic congestion, ambiguities over privately-owned port
facilities, as well as opposition to regulatory processes and security rules, port
operations are adversely affected.
South Africa, however, addresses these issues with the SA Maritime Transport
Security Bill.
The ISPS Code has some limitations regarding the types of boats to which it
can be applied, including the exclusion of fishing vessels, government-owned or
managed ships, and ships used solely for intrastate commerce.
Each requirement of the Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulation,
the risk of non-compliance with the requirement, and the control measures
implemented to reduce the risks are detailed in a Compliance Control Plan, is created
by the Compliance Division of the Transnet National Port Authority.
With the use of these security measures, South African ports can continue to
be recognized as secure ports and preserve their ISPS Code status.
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Chapter 5
5.1

Conclusions

It is essential that ports and terminals be adequately protected by both the maritime
sector and the government at all times. A breach in port security might have disastrous
effects on a country's economy and perhaps the world's economy as a whole. Port users
and terminal operators should be aware of their own vulnerabilities and should be wellversed in the intricacies of the ISPS Code in order to help minimize these dangers. As
a result, the global economy is dependent on the safety of terminals and ports to
transport goods and people from one location to another. The port's operating
conditions have vastly improved after the ISPS code was put into place. Port users
have increased their use of Nigeria's ports as a result of the introduction of perimeter
fencing, surveillance, access control, trained and adequate security personnel, and
proactive measures that have eliminated hawking, touting, pilfering, stowaway, and
other illicit activities in Nigeria's maritime domain. Nevertheless, compliance levels
are not still up to maximum levels.
The ISPS Code has had a significant impact on port safety and efficiency in
Nigeria, which cannot be understated. In Nigeria, the primary purpose of the ISPS
code has been met to a great degree. Maritime industries have seen a rise in the degree
of security. There is no doubt that risks cannot be completely avoided, but the ISPS is
a great step forward in reducing their impact on the marine environment. On average,
64.8% of ports meet the requirements of the ISPS Code regime, according to the report.

5.2

Recommendations

From the findings of the study, the following recommendations were made:
1. Non-compliant terminals and jetties must, nevertheless, meet the requirements of
the ISPS Code. To guarantee complete compliance, the enforcement staff must be
thoroughly taught and sensitized regarding the application of the code. NIMSA
should also work more closely with its sibling organizations.
2. Corruption needs to be addressed in order to fill the gaps identified by this study.
Corruption has permeated the country's security apparatus deeply, making it easier
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for pirates to operate. In order to reduce piracy on Nigerian waterways, corruption
must be reduced. The nation's security system might be accessed by a panel of
investigators. Any marine security-related issues should be able to be investigated
by such a panel, and it should have access to knowledgeable information about any
suspected officers, whether they be security or governmental.
3. Based on the research findings, it is recommended that the countries' security
policies in the maritime domain should be restructured to allow institutional
governance structures that will mitigate corruption in the port’s processes and in
acquiring security tools and equipment. This strategic framework will allow fair
play among the stakeholders and co-management, which will mitigate corruption
in the system shown from the research findings.
4. Efforts must be made to improve implementation tactics to make them more userfriendly, economical, and successful.
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Appendix
Questionnaire
Section A: Institutional Biodata
1. What is the name of your Ministry/Department/Agency?
.................................................................................................................................
2. Location of the Ministry/Department/Agency headquarters?
.................................................................................................................................
3. Types of Business/Operations?
.................................................................................................................................
4. (a). Regular
(b). Landlord
(c). Enforcement
(d). Shipping
(e). Operators
(f). Administration
(g). others
Section: B
On the Challenges Encountered in the Implementation of the ISPS Code in
Nigeria
5. What are the challenges encountered in the implementation of the ship security
plan (SSP)? (Please rank in a scale of 1–7; where 7 is for the most important
challenge and 1 for the least important)
(a) Poor funding
(b) Bad management
(c) Corruption
(d) Government interference
(e) Infrastructural deficiency
(f) Inadequate modern technology
(g) Sabotage
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6. What are the challenges encountered in the implementation of the port facility
security plan (PFSP)? (Please rank in a scale of 1–7; where 7 is for the most
important challenge and 1 for the least important)
(h) Poor funding
(i) Bad management
(j) Corruption
(k) Government interference
(l) Infrastructural deficiency
(m) Inadequate modern technology
(n) Sabotage
7. What are the challenges encountered in the implementation of the ISPS Code in
general? (Please rank in a scale of 1–7; where 7 is for the most important
challenged and 1 for the least important)
(o) Poor funding
(p) Bad management
(q) Corruption
(r) Government interference
(s) Infrastructural deficiency
(t) Inadequate modern technology
(u) Sabotage

8. Kindly suggest possible solution to the problems
...............................................................................………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
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